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Previous research has reliably found that self-control strength moderates the anxiety-
performance relationship for cognitive and perceptual-motor tasks that involve executive
functioning. In the present preregistered experiment (N = 200; https://aspredicted.
org/a775h.pdf), we investigated whether the interaction of anxiety and self-control
also predicts creative flexibility performance. According to the Attentional Control
Theory, anxiety can impair executive functioning. In the case that creative flexibility
relies on executive functions, anxiety should therefore interfere with creative flexibility
performance. However, self-control strength has been demonstrated to serve as a
buffer against the negative effects of anxiety on executive functioning. Therefore,
we assumed that there will be a negative relationship between anxiety and creative
flexibility performance, and that this negative relationship would be more pronounced
for participants who are low compared to high in momentary self-control strength.
Analogous to the previous studies, we manipulated the participants’ self-control strength
(ego depletion vs. no depletion) and subsequently induced a potentially threatening
test situation. The participants then completed a measure of their state anxiety and a
standardized test of creative flexibility. Contrary to our expectation, self-control strength,
state anxiety, and their interaction did not predict creative flexibility performance.
Complementary Bayesian hypothesis testing revealed strong support for the null
hypothesis. Therefore, we conclude that, at least under certain conditions, creative
flexibility performance may be unrelated to resource-dependent executive functions.
Keywords: anxiety, Bayesian hypothesis testing, creativity, ego depletion, executive functions, creative flexibility,
self-control, working memory
INTRODUCTION
The quality and duration of our lives are oftentimes based on people’s creativity—think, for
instance, of the inventions of the light bulb or aseptic techniques. Creativity describes the
production of novel and useful products or ideas instead of reproducing previously learned patterns
of cognitive responses (Barron, 1955; Mumford, 2003). One important aspect of creativity is creative
flexibility, which refers to the variety of one’s novel ideas; that is, creative flexibility is reflected by
the number of diverging categories under which the meaningful ideas concerning a specific issue
can be subsumed rather than the pure amount of novel ideas (Plucker and Kaufman, 2011). Thus,
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being creatively flexible regarding solutions not only means to
leave the usual ways of thinking about something behind, but also
to mentally change perspectives repeatedly.
Given the importance of such creative flexibility for human
progress, it is highly necessary to understand the preconditions
of creativity (Plucker and Kaufman, 2011). Previous research has
suggested that creativity is (to some degree) reliant on cognitive
abilities (Cropley, 1966), motivation (Collins and Amabile, 1999),
or certain personality components (Feist, 1998). However, these
variables can only explain a small amount of variance in creative
performance, which raises the question of which other processes
are behind creativity (Batey and Furnham, 2006). Earlier research
viewed creativity as an aspect of intelligence, but today, many
researchers agree that although creativity requires a basic level
of intelligence (Barron, 1969), creativity and intelligence are
not identical constructs (Guilford, 1967; Carroll, 1993). This
conclusion is further supported by a recent meta-analysis, that
only found a moderate relationship between creativity and
intelligence (Kim, 2005).
Some authors have argued that creative performance benefits
from effortful, controlled, resource-dependent information
processing and executive functioning (e.g., Nusbaum and Silvia,
2011; Benedek et al., 2014). According to this view, to master
a creativity task, high attentional control is required. In this
context, Nusbaum and Silvia (2011) concluded that “executive
cognition is central to creative thought” (p. 36). Executive
functions describe basic mental processes that enable us to
control our thoughts and behavior (Miyake et al., 2000). The basic
executive functions are inhibition, shifting, and updating (Miyake
et al., 2000). According to Miyake et al. (2000), inhibition is
defined as “the ability to deliberately inhibit dominant automatic
or prepotent responses when necessary” (p. 57). Shifting means
“shifting back and forth between multiple tasks, operations,
or mental sets” (p. 55), while updating enables the “updating
and monitoring of working memory representations” (p. 56).
These basic executive functions have been found to be relevant
for creativity (Vartanian, 2009; Nijstad et al., 2010), because
creativity often requires the ability to inhibit certain dominant
tendencies, to shift attention to novel cues, and to flexibly
change a certain perspective. For instance, brainstorming about
novel ways to heal a disease or to advertise a brand requires
one to mentally override established concepts and inhibit the
individual’s automatic influence on thinking. Simultaneously,
one has to direct attention to categories of information that
have not yet been considered in this regard, reflect on them,
and, when indicated, refuse thinking in this direction and steer
one’s attention to the information of other categories. During
this cognitive process, one is also mentally engaged by keeping
up information concerning important frame conditions. The
overarching theoretical framework for these considerations is
the controlled-attention theory of creativity (Beaty et al., 2014).
According to this approach, “controlled processes provide goal-
directed, top-down oversight during creative idea production”
(Beaty et al., 2014, p. 1187).
However, there are also other opinions in the ongoing
discussion regarding how creative performance is generated.
Some authors believe that creativity happens in an effortless,
automatic, and resource-independent manner in associative
networks and that high attentional control impairs creativity
(Wiley and Jarosz, 2012; Furley and Memmert, 2015). Jarosz
et al. (2012) even postulate that “superior executive functioning,
such as increased attentional control, may in fact be detrimental
to reaching creative solutions” (p. 488; see also Stolte et al.,
2019). According to this view, high attentional control would
hinder one’s creativity because individuals tend to rigidly focus
on certain aspects of a given creativity task, which do not lead to
a solution while ignoring other, potentially relevant cues (Wiley
and Jarosz, 2012). There are also empirical findings, albeit quite
a few, that creative flexibility is unrelated to working memory
capacity (De Dreu et al., 2012), meaning that controlled attention
should not be necessary for creative flexibility.
Creative performance can also be understood as the product
of both largely effortless default information processing and
executive control processes. Recently, Beaty et al. (2016) have
argued in this way and refer in this regard to findings
on dynamically cooperating networks of the brain. For our
present study, it is crucial that Beaty et al. (2016) assume that
creative performance—particularly creative idea generation and
evaluation—is also based on executive control.
If creative flexibility depends (partly) on executive
functioning, as suggested by the controlled-attention theory
(Beaty et al., 2014) and the theory of default and executive
control network dynamics (Beaty et al., 2016), it should be
hampered by anything that interferes with executive functioning
and controlled attention. One influential variable can be anxiety,
an emotion that has been extensively studied in a variety of
performance contexts (Deese et al., 1953; Hammermeister and
Burton, 1995; Zeidner, 1998, 2007; Ashcraft and Kirk, 2001;
Biasutti and Concina, 2014). According to the attentional control
theory (ACT), anxiety impairs executive functioning because
anxiety-based worries consume working memory capacity,
leading to cognitive interference (Eysenck et al., 2007). Several
experimental studies have supported this assumption, showing
that anxiety negatively affects inhibition (Calvo, 1996), shifting
(Harris and Cumming, 2003), and updating (Calvo et al., 1992) in
various tasks. So, if executive functioning is involved in creative
performance, higher anxiety should be related to lower creative
performance. In line with this notion, a meta-analysis revealed a
negative anxiety-creative performance relationship (Byron and
Khazanchi, 2011). However, creative flexibility was not explicitly
analyzed in this study; therefore, further research is also needed
in this respect.
The ACT states that individuals are generally capable of
reducing the negative effects of anxiety on executive functioning,
but the theory fails to clarify why individuals do not always
manage to counteract anxiety-related performance decrements
(Englert and Bertrams, 2015). Recent empirical findings hint
that the level of momentarily available self-control strength
may determine whether anxiety impairs executive functioning
and subsequent performance or not (Englert and Bertrams,
2012; Bertrams et al., 2013; Englert et al., 2015). Here, self-
control means the process in which an individual volitionally
overrides dominant affective, cognitive, or behavioral tendencies
(Baumeister et al., 2007).
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The strength model of self-control states that there is an
energy resource on which all self-control acts are based (Muraven
and Baumeister, 2000; Baumeister and Vohs, 2016; Baumeister
et al., 2018). This resource has a limited capacity, which after
having worked on a self-control demanding task, can become
temporarily depleted; this depleted state has been named ego
depletion (Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 1998). It
has been repeatedly demonstrated that self-control performance
suffers during the state of ego depletion (Hagger et al., 2010;
Dang et al., 2019). For instance, individuals who had to suppress
their emotions while watching an upsetting video clip performed
significantly worse in a subsequent self-control task when
compared with individuals who did not have to suppress their
emotions while watching the identical video clip (Schmeichel
et al., 2003). Important for the present study is the finding that
attention regulation also requires self-control strength. During
the state of ego depletion, individuals are less adept in volitionally
controlling their attention (Schmeichel and Baumeister, 2010;
Englert et al., 2015).
There is reliable evidence that the effect of anxiety on
executive functioning and subsequent performance is moderated
by the level of momentarily available self-control strength
(Englert and Bertrams, 2015). Individuals only displayed the
typical anxiety-related performance decrements in cognitively
demanding mental tasks during the state of ego depletion;
however, anxious students with intact self-control strength were
able to perform at the same level as non-anxious students
(Bertrams et al., 2013; Bertrams and Englert, 2014). These
findings have also been found in the field of sport psychology:
In evaluative, anxiety-provoking test situations, athletes in the
state of ego depletion performed significantly worse than their
non-depleted counterparts in sports-related tasks that depend
on executive functioning (Englert and Bertrams, 2012; Englert
et al., 2015). Furthermore, anxious participants’ gaze behavior,
which is viewed as a reliable indicator of executive functioning
in some perceptual-motor tasks (Henderson, 2003), was less
effective in the state of ego depletion, lending further support
to the assumption that self-control strength may be the missing
link in ACT (Englert et al., 2015). The explanation for these
findings is that anxious individuals can in principle use self-
control to divert their attention away from anxiety-based
worries and focus on the task at hand. In this case there
is no cognitive interference and no decline in the executive
functioning. However, this compensation of anxiety becomes less
effective in the state of ego depletion as self-control decreases
(Bertrams et al., 2013, 2016).
The studies that examined self-control strength as a moderator
of the anxiety-performance relationship (e.g., Englert and
Bertrams, 2012; Bertrams et al., 2013), exclusively used tasks in
which either the only correct solution had to be found (e.g.,
the clearly defined one solution of an IQ task) or a clearly
defined 100% mark had to be approached as close as possible
(e.g., to be successful in as many of ten basketball free throws
as possible). Creative flexibility performance (i.e., generating
various solutions) has never been investigated in this regard.
The purpose of the present study was therefore to investigate
creative flexibility as the dependent measure of performance to
supplement the existing studies. In addition, we aimed in this
way to contribute to the under-researched relationship between
creative flexibility and anxiety as well as executive functioning.
We tested the hypothesis that self-control strength moderates
the relationship between anxiety and creative flexibility in
the present preregistered study1. We adopted the sequential-
task paradigm (Baumeister et al., 1998), that is, participants
worked on a primary task that either required self-control
(depletion condition) or did not require self-control (non-
depletion condition). The secondary task was a standardized
measure of creative flexibility that had to be solved under
evaluative, potentially anxiety-provoking conditions. Moreover,
we measured the participants’ anxiety in the evaluative situation.
The total procedure paralleled the one used in previous studies
that found the moderating effect of self-control strength on the
anxiety-performance relationship (Englert and Bertrams, 2012;
Bertrams et al., 2013), except for the fact that the secondary task
measured creative flexibility performance this time. Analogous to
the previous studies, we assumed that there will be a negative
relationship between anxiety and performance, and that this
negative relationship would be more pronounced for depleted
than for non-depleted participants.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ethics Statement
The local ethics committee of the Faculty of Human Sciences at
the University of Bern approved the present study in advance.
Prior to starting the experiment, we obtained written informed
consent from all participants. The current study was carried out
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and the ethical
guidelines for experimental research with human participants as
proposed by the Swiss Psychological Society and the American
Psychological Association.
Participants
An a priori power analysis using G∗Power 3.1 (Faul et al.,
2007) indicated that a sample size of at least 160 participants
would be required to detect a small effect (power analysis: linear
multiple regression, fixed model, R2 increase, a priori; input
parameters: f 2 = 0.05, α = 0.05, 1−β = 0.80, number of tested
predictors = 1, total number of predictors = 3). We decided to
stop data collection either on May 10, 2017 (for organizational
reasons) or when we reached a sample size of 210 participants
(i.e., 50 people more than the minimum sample size). Most
participants were university students recruited in the university
buildings. Some participants were recruited by graduate students
majoring in educational psychology at the University of Bern
who asked their acquaintances to join the study. Among
the 210 participants, four (who had mistakenly received
the wrong material at some time during the experimental
procedure) had to be excluded. Another three were excluded
because they suspected the hypothesis (nearly) correctly. One
additional participant who did not follow the instructions of
1https://aspredicted.org/a775h.pdf
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the manipulation task was also excluded. These decisions were
made prior to data analyses. Because two participants had missing
values for the anxiety measure, the final sample consisted of
200 participants (69% female; Mage = 26.67, SDage = 10.31). The
experimenters declared that all participants understood the
instructions (all in German) well. All participants gave their
informed consent.
Procedure
Participation took place in a quiet laboratory room with constant
lighting conditions in a building at the University of Bern.
Experimental sessions were held in groups of up to five
participants, each working in a separate, single working partition.
First, the participants read and signed the informed consent form.
Next, we applied the sequential-task paradigm. Participants
were randomly assigned to either a depletion condition or a
non-depletion condition (Baumeister et al., 1998). Therefore, at
the beginning of the experiment, we manipulated self-control
strength by administering the well-validated transcription
task (Bertrams et al., 2010, 2013; Reinhard et al., 2013;
Wolff et al., 2013; Dummel and Rummel, 2016; Englert and
Bertrams, 2017; Lindner et al., 2017; Wiesner and Lindner,
2017): Announced as an examination of handwriting, all
participants transcribed a neutral text about the history of a
city on a separate sheet of paper either without using the
frequent letters “e” and “n” (depletion condition; n = 94)
or without omitting any letters (non-depletion condition;
n = 106). By volitionally overriding well-elaborated writing
habits, the participants’ self-control resources should have
become temporarily diminished in the depletion condition
while remaining relatively intact in the non-depletion condition
(Bertrams et al., 2010). An English translation of this task is
provided in the supplemental material of a recently published
article (Bertrams et al., 2015). After 6 min, the experimenter
stopped the participants and asked them to put the material back
in an envelope (ensuring that the experimenter remained blind to
the experimental condition).
Following the transcription task, the participants worked on
a standardized three-item manipulation check (“How effortful
did you find the transcription task?”, “How difficult did you
find to execute the transcription task?”, and “How much did
you suppress your usual writing habits during the transcription
task?”; α = 0.80) and completed a single item on perceived
competence (“How successful have you been in performing the
transcription task?”). All the items had to be answered on Likert-
type scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). These
measures have repeatedly been used in ego depletion research
using the transcription task and have found to be reliable (e.g.,
Bertrams and Englert, 2014; Englert and Bertrams, 2016).
Then, we asked the participants to work on the state version
of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson
et al., 1988; Krohne et al., 1996) to rule out the possibility that
the transcription task evoked unintended group differences in
mood. The PANAS consists of 10 items measuring positive affect
(e.g., “happy”; α = 0.87) and 10 items assessing negative affect
(e.g., “sad”; α = 0.68). We also included five additional items on
subjectively experienced lack of energy (e.g., “inert”; α = 0.82;
Abele-Brehm and Brehm, 1986) to explore whether self-perceived
exhaustion mediates the effect of self-control strength on the
anxiety–performance relationship. The participants indicated on
each item how much they were feeling this way at the moment
using 5-point Likert-type scales (1 = not at all to 5 = extremely).
In the next step, we increased the evaluative character
of the testing situation by adapting the instructions from
previous anxiety research (Murray and Janelle, 2003; Behan
and Wilson, 2008; Bertrams et al., 2013). The participants
received a sheet that announced a test on personal creativity,
explained the enormous importance of creative flexibility, and
informed them that they would receive personal face-to-face
feedback about their performance and that their performance
would be compared with the performance of other participants.
Moreover, the participants were informed about the time limit
of 2.5 min. After signaling that they had carefully read the
instructions, they received the original instructions of the
subtest Features-Abilities (Eigenschaften-Fähigkeiten) from the
Berlin Intelligence Structure Test (Berliner Intelligenzstruktur-
Test; BIS), which included a sample item (Jäger et al., 1997).
Previous research has revealed that announcing a test this
way elicits differences in state anxiety between participants
(Bertrams et al., 2013).
Afterwards, we administered the well-validated brief version
of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-SKD) to measure the
participants’ level of state anxiety (Englert et al., 2011). Five items
(e.g., “I am nervous”) had to be answered on 4-point Likert-type
scales, which indicated how they felt at that specific moment
(1 = not at all to 4 = very, α = 0.83). The STAI-SKD has been
demonstrated to be sensitive to situational threats induced by
evaluative performance situations (Bertrams and Englert, 2013).
For such situations, it has also been shown that the STAI-SKD
captures variance in state anxiety stemming from individual
differences in trait test anxiety (i.e., susceptibility to become
anxious when facing a test) (Bertrams and Englert, 2013).
Then, it followed the performance measure of creative
flexibility. As previously mentioned, creativity can be understood
as a process in which an individual is generating novel ideas
(Barron, 1969; Mumford, 2003). For this reason, we measured
creativity by administering a standardized test, specifically, the
subtest Features-Abilities (Eigenschaften-Fähigkeiten) from the
BIS (Jäger et al., 1997). Specific subtests of the BIS have repeatedly
been applied in previous creativity research, including to measure
creative performance as an independent variable in experiments
(Benedek et al., 2012; Lichtenfeld et al., 2012; Roeser et al.,
2015). The participants were asked to write on the response
sheet as many different features and abilities that a seller
should not have as possible. According to the manual, after
2.5 min, the experimenter stopped the task. Creative flexibility
was coded according to the standardized guidelines in the test
manual (i.e., counting the number of various categories in
a participant’s responses) once by a group of inexperienced
educational psychology students and then independently by an
experienced research assistant. Because both codings were highly
correlated (r = 0.69, p < 0.001), we took the mean of both as our
dependent variable of creative flexibility (note that the results did
not change by only using either coding).
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After the measure of creative performance, the participants
completed a post-experimental questionnaire. In the
questionnaire, the participants’ knowledge of the actual
hypothesis was checked, and information about gender, age,
education/employment, and language ability was requested.
Finally, the participants were thanked and carefully debriefed.
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
We conducted t-tests to check the success of the experimental
manipulation. For this, we applied two-tailed testing against
a 0.05 level of significance. The manipulation check indicated
that our manipulation of self-control strength was successful
because the depletion group (M = 3.83, SD = 1.30) gave a higher
rating than the non-depletion group (M = 3.10, SD = 1.35),
t(198) = 3.88, 95% CI of the difference [0.36, 1.10], p < 0.001,
d = 0.55. There was no statistically significant difference between
the depletion and non-depletion groups in how successful
the participants perceived themselves in the transcription task,
p = 0.16. Moreover, the transcription task did not result in
differences between the two experimental conditions in positive
affect or negative affect, ps > 0.06. Thus, the transcription did
not produce unintended differences in self-confidence or mood
(still, we controlled for these variables in the auxiliary analyses;
see below). As in previous research (Bertrams et al., 2013), the two
experimental groups also did not differ in state anxiety, p = 0.36.
The SDs of state anxiety in the depletion (M = 1.76, SD = 0.53)
and the non-depletion condition (M = 1.69, SD = 0.49) resembled
the ones in two previous experiments that revealed a significant
interaction between ego depletion and state anxiety in regressing
performance (SD interval in Bertrams et al., 2013: [0.46, 0.56]).
Main Analyses
The mean for creative flexibility (number of various categories)
was 7.03 (SD = 1.87) for the overall sample, 7.07 (SD = 1.66)
for the depletion condition, and 6.99 (SD = 2.04) for the non-
depletion condition. Neither self-control strength (experimental
condition) nor state anxiety correlated with creative flexibility,
r(198) = −0.02, 95% CI [−0.16, 0.12], p = 0.77, and
r(198) = 0.02, 95% CI [−0.12, 0.16], p = 0.80, respectively
(bivariate correlations, two-tailed tests). Applying a hierarchical
multiple regression analysis, we regressed creative flexibility on
the manipulation of self-control strength and z-standardized
state anxiety scores, adding their interaction in a second block.
For each predictor, we tested against the significance level of
α = 0.05 (two-tailed tests). As can be seen in Table 1, none
of the independent variables significantly predicted creative
flexibility (ps > 0.44). The regression slopes were small and
even contrarily directed to what a resource-dependence view of
creativity would suggest.
We checked for univariate outliers (z-standardized state
anxiety scores> 3.29) and for multivariate outliers (Mahalanobis
distance values > 16.27), as recommended by Tabachnick and
Fidell (2007). In this way, we detected one outlying case; however,
repeating the regression analysis while excluding this participant
TABLE 1 | Hierarchical multiple regression analysis regressing creative flexibility on
self-control strength (experimental condition), state anxiety, and their interaction.
Block and predictor Main-effects
model
Full model with
interaction
Block 1: main effects
Self-control strengtha B = −0.07, 95% CI
[−0.60, 0.45],
β = −0.02, p = 0.78
B = −0.07, 95% CI
[−0.60, 0.45],
β = −0.02, p = 0.78
Anxiety B = 0.03, 95% CI
[−0.23, 0.30],
β = 0.02, p = 0.81
B = 0.13, 95% CI
[−0.24, 0.50],
β = 0.07, p = 0.48
Block 2: interaction
Self-control strength × anxiety B = −0.21, 95% CI
[−0.73, 0.32],
β = −0.08, p = 0.44
Overall model R2 0.001 0.004
Adjusted R2 −0.009 −0.01
1R2 0.001 0.003
1F 0.07 (p = 0.93) 0.59 (p = 0.44)
Overall F 0.07 (p = 0.93) 0.25 (p = 0.87)
df for overall F 2, 197 3, 196
N = 200. aCoding of the experimental conditions: 0 = depletion, 1 = no depletion.
did not change the results. Inspecting the normal probability
plot of the regression standardized residual led us to conclude
that no serious violation of the normality assumption was given.
Normalizing the slightly skewed state anxiety scores by applying
a log transformation (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007) and repeating
the regression analysis did not alter the results. Furthermore,
when entering positive affect, negative affect, self-reported lack
of energy, and perceived competence during the transcription
task as covariates, the results remained the same. Because we did
not find the predicted effect in the main analyses, we omitted
the preregistered analysis on whether an experienced lack of
energy mediates it.
Complementary Bayesian Hypothesis
Testing
Given the null results reported in the main analyses, we aimed
to conclude that the assumed relationship between anxiety
and creative flexibility under ego depletion does not exist (i.e.,
that the null hypothesis is likely to be true). In contrast to
conventional null hypothesis statistical testing (NHST), Bayesian
hypothesis testing allows for the quantification of evidence for
the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2014; Wagenmakers et al., 2018a,b).
Therefore, we applied the functions Bayesian Correlation Pairs
and Bayesian Linear Regression in the software JASP (JASP
Team, 2018) to determine the relevant Bayes factors that could
express the intensity of the evidence that the data provide for
the null hypothesis versus the alternative hypothesis (BF01).
To interpret each BF01, we used the classification scheme
provided by Wagenmakers et al. (2018a).
There was “strong evidence” that there was no bivariate
correlation between self-control strength (experimental
condition) and creative flexibility, BF01 = 14.08 [settings:
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correlated positively (i.e., alternative hypothesis = creative
flexibility performance is lower in the depletion compared with
the non-depletion condition), stretched beta prior width = 1].
Moreover, the evidence was “strong” that state anxiety did
not correlate with creative flexibility, BF01 = 13.72 (settings:
correlated negatively, stretched beta prior width = 1). These
results indicate that the observed data are 14.08 times and 13.72
times, respectively, more likely under the null hypothesis (i.e.,
no correlation exists) than under the alternative hypothesis (i.e.,
there is a correlation).
Next, we regressed creative flexibility on the experimental
manipulation of self-control strength, z-standardized state
anxiety scores, and their interaction. The multiple regression
analysis revealed “very strong evidence” that the full model
(i.e., the two main effects plus their interaction) did not predict
creative flexibility, BF01 = 69.67. Furthermore, the evidence was
“strong” that the main-effects model was also not predictive of
creative flexibility, BF01 = 26.08. In other words, the null model
outpredicted the two models that contained the predictors.
DISCUSSION
Previous research has suggested that the negative effects of
anxiety on certain types of performance can be reduced
by engaging in self-control. Therefore, if one’s self-control
resources are momentarily depleted, higher anxiety should be
related to weaker performance (Englert and Bertrams, 2015).
This assumption has been empirically supported in several
studies, which have shown that ego depletion moderates the
effects of anxiety on performance in different cognitive (e.g.,
Bertrams et al., 2013) and perceptual-motor tasks (e.g., Englert
and Bertrams, 2012) that depend on executive functioning.
However, this has not yet been tested for performance in
creative flexibility. The present study addressed this shortcoming:
Paralleling the procedure of previous studies, we examined
whether anxious participants would be less creatively flexible
when their self-control strength is depleted when compared
with non-depleted. However, we found that reduced self-
control strength, anxiety, and their interaction did not predict
performance in creative flexibility. This null finding stems
from a sufficiently large sample size of N = 200 (note that
the present sample was large enough to detect a relatively
small effect of f 2 = 0.04). In addition, Bayesian hypothesis
testing revealed strong evidence for the null hypothesis (i.e.,
there is no relationship between the assumed predictors and
creative flexibility).
A potential explanation for the unexpected pattern of results
may lie in our general assumption that creative flexibility is
based on executive functions. As noted in the introduction,
there is also a view in the creativity literature that creative
performance does not depend on executive functioning. Instead,
it is assumed that the creative process takes place in associative
networks and is effortless, automatic, and resource-independent
(Wiley and Jarosz, 2012; Furley and Memmert, 2015). In line
with this notion, De Dreu et al. (2012) found creative flexibility
to be unrelated to working memory capacity. Our results may
contribute to the debate on whether creativity is resource
dependent or, at least under certain conditions, primarily an
automatically executed process. Optimistically, one could say
that the important human ability to creatively come up with
various novel ideas is not easily impaired by adverse conditions
and negative affect. Future experimental research designs may
offer further insight about this observation. Thereby, one should
keep in mind that the present study has only examined a very
specific type of creative performance and is not necessarily
meaningful for all creative tasks (e.g., the composition of a witty
piece of music).
Another explanation would be that the methods in the present
study did not work or even that ego depletion just does not
exist (Carter et al., 2015; but for a contrary perspective, see
also Baumeister et al., 2018). We do not want to go into
a theoretical in-depth discussion about the existence or non-
existence of ego depletion here. Instead, we would like to
point out that we used established procedures and measures
that have been repeatedly and successfully applied in previous
research to investigate whether the interaction between self-
control strength and anxiety predicts performance (Englert and
Bertrams, 2012, 2015; Bertrams et al., 2013; Englert et al.,
2015). Using these methods has reliably revealed statistically
significant results across a wide range of performance domains
(e.g., reasoning, mental calculation, dart tossing) and groups
of participants (e.g., athletes, school students, undergraduates).
Therefore, we favor the above mentioned explanation that,
under specific conditions, creative flexibility does not depend on
executive functioning. This interpretation is supported by the
fact that both ego depletion and state anxiety did not predict
creative performance in the present study, and overall, the
adverse effect of anxiety on executive functions is well established
(Eysenck et al., 2007).
Taken together, the present study did not support our
main hypothesis that ego depletion moderates the effect
of anxiety on creative flexibility. Moreover, there was no
main effect of ego depletion or state anxiety. Nonetheless,
our findings can add to the discussion on how creative
behavior is generated, suggesting that at least sometimes
creative flexibility seems to be independent of executive
functions (cf. De Dreu et al., 2012). Bayesian hypothesis testing
(Wagenmakers et al., 2018a,b) may be an appropriate way
to test the diverging assumptions from different theoretical
accounts in creativity research (requiring vs. not requiring
executive functions) against each other. With regard to
our research program on the moderation of the anxiety-
performance relationship through self-control, we must limit
the scope of validity: Creative flexibility does not seem to be
predictable in the same way as other types of performance
we have studied in the past (e.g., Englert and Bertrams, 2012;
Bertrams et al., 2013).
However, the findings of the present study must not be
overgeneralized. Creativity is a rather broad construct, which
means that various types of performances with their specific
measurements can be subsumed under this term (Villani and
Antonietti, 2013). It is still possible that other measures of
creative performance such as the draw an alien task (Ward, 1994)
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would depend on anxiety and self-control strength. The same
may be the case when other techniques to evaluate creativity
are used, for example, the newly developed metric forward flow
(Gray et al., 2019). Furthermore, certain task parameters of
the creativity measure (e.g., the task duration; see Beaty and
Silvia, 2012) could influence the results. In addition, sophisticated
statistical methods that can account for variability in relevant
person-related factors (e.g., the personality dimension openness
to experience or the momentary mood) may be applied. For
instance, linear mixed-effects models (Barr, 2013) which allow to
control for such variability may yield a different finding than the
present one. Our study may thus be considered as only the first
step in investigating the relational pattern of anxiety, self-control
strength, and creativity, and can serve as a reference point for
corresponding future research.
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